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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION (U)

1. (U) Mission. The mission of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI) is to provide professional and administrative staff support to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI). The ACSI, as a member of the Army General Staff, is responsible for overall coordination of the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the US Army, and staff supervision of the US Army Intelligence Operations Detachment (USAIOD), an OACSI FOA. The ACSI is the Army observer and representative on the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the Army member of the Military Intelligence Board, Chairman of the Army Classification Review Board, and the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) focal point for the Army. In discharging these responsibilities, equitable consideration is given to the Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. Within the scope of assigned responsibilities, the ACSI has a relationship to the Chief of Staff corresponding to that of a Deputy Chief of Staff. More detailed statements of the functions and responsibilities of the ACSI are contained in AR 10-5, Organization and Functions--Department of the Army, CSR 10-27, Organization and Functions - Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and AR 10-61, Organization and Functions--US Army Intelligence Operations Detachment.

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2. (U) Personnel.

a. (U) LTG Sidney T. Weinstein replaced LTG W. E. Odom as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) in August 1985.

b. (U) BG R. A. Greenwalt replaced BG J. W. Shufelt as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI) in August 1985.

c. (U) Dr R. Glenn Priddy left the position of Special Assistant to the ACSI in September 1985. This position remained unfilled through the remainder of FY 1985.

d. (U) COL Ira C. Owens replaced COL Stanley H. Hyman as Executive Officer in January 1985. COL Hyman was promoted to Brigadier General and assumed command of the newly organized U.S. Army Intelligence Agency, a field operating agency of the OACSI. BG Hyman was also dual-hatted as a DACSI.

e. (U) MAJ Donald Kerrick replaced MAJ Larry Miller as Assistant Executive Officer.

3. (U) Staffing. Authorized strength figures for OACSI and USAIOD are in TABLE 1. OACSI lost five military and two civilian spaces to help pay for the establishment of the new Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Management (OACSIM). One enlisted space was converted to a civilian position as part of the Total Army Analysis (TAA) 91 civilianization effort. The USAIOD gave up one officer position under the three percent field operating agency decrement.

TABLE 1

OACSI AND IOD AUTHORIZED STRENGTH FIGURES

<u>OACSI STAFF</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOT MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOT MPR</u>
Start FY 85	[REDACTED]					
End FY 85	[REDACTED]					

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<u>USAIOD</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOT MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOT MPR</u>
Start FY 85	[REDACTED]					
End FY 85	[REDACTED]					

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SECTION 2

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS

1. (U) ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES.

a. (U) Throughout this period, the Directorate worked to identify an individual to fill the position of Deputy Director, Intelligence Systems Directorate. The inability to identify a qualified multi-discipline individual to fill this position, coupled with the loss of the O-6 (colonel) billet in the Imagery Intelligence Topography and Meteorology Division (DAMI-ISP) resulted in a decision to rewrite the job description for the GM-15 billet. The billet was transferred to the Imagery Intelligence Division and was rewritten as the Division Chief for that element of the Intelligence Systems Directorate.

b. (U) Due to a reduction in Army Staff positions, HUMINT Division lost one O-5 HUMINT staff officer slot. In order to compensate for this loss in operational support, one enlisted administrative support position was converted to a civilian Intelligence Operations Specialist, thus enabling the Division to avoid degradation of its oversight responsibilities.

c. (U) The responsibility for coordination of the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) was transferred to the Intelligence Systems Integration Division (DAMI-ISI). LTC William B. Henline had performed that function in DAMI-ISP. His replacement was assigned to DAMI-ISI. LTC Henline remained through the end of the fiscal year in

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DAMI-ISP, but was considered excess. Although the OACSI TDA had not been officially changed, the intent was to transfer this officer position from DAMI-ISP to DAMI-ISI.

d. (U) There was a reorganization effort to merge the Signals Intelligence Division (DAMI-ISS) and DAMI-ISP into a Technical Intelligence Systems Division. This division would have been headed by the Chief of DAMI-ISS. The reorganization was cancelled. Approval from the Director of the Army Staff had not been obtained, and there was a possibility that some civilian positions would be adversely affected.

e. (U) DAMI-ISI assumed primary staff responsibility for intelligence support to Central America (CENTAM) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). This resulted in increased emphasis on language support, Special Operating Forces (SOF) and low intensity conflict (LIC).

2. (U) KEY PERSONNEL.

a. (U) Director of Intelligence Systems (DAMI-ISI).

(1) (U) BG Stanley H. Hyman replaced BG William E. Harmon as Director of Intelligence Systems in January 1985. BG Harmon became the Program Manager for the All Source Analysis System (ASAS).

(2) (U) Colonel Richard J. Powers, Jr., replaced BG Stanley H. Hyman as Director in August 1985. BG Hyman assumed command of the newly formed Army Intelligence Agency (AIA). LTC Stephen C. Conrad replaced LTC Kurt Siemon as executive in June 1985. Mrs. Margaret J. Barry replaced Mrs. Mary Brill as secretary in December 1985.

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b. (U) Intelligence Systems Integration Division (DAMI-ISI).

(1) (U) COL Daniel Larsen moved from Chief of the Training Branch to replace COL Dennis Langley as division chief in January 1985. COL Langley went to the Defense Intelligence Agency. In September 1985, COL Edwin A. Tivol replaced COL Larsen as division chief. COL Larsen went to the National War College in August 1985.

(2) (U) Mr. John McGlone was reassigned in February 1985 to the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) Program Office. His duties were assigned to various action officers in the division.

(3) (U) In January 1985, MAJ James H. Cox was assigned to DAMI-ISI as the Army Language Program Manager. LTC James H. Thompson filled the position vacated by COL Larsen in April 1985. LTC Patrick J. Neimann replaced LTC Gary Sokness in May 1985. In August 1985, MAJ David Eggle replaced MAJ Richard Layton who had been reassigned to the OACSI Staff Action Control Office in May 1985. MAJ Gary McMillan was reassigned in June 1985.

c. (U) Imagery Intelligence Topography Meteorology Division (DAMI-ISP). COL Ralph A. Mason retired in late FY 85. Since the DAMI-ISP 0-6 position had been transferred to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Management in late FY 84, there was no replacement for COL Mason. LTC Harry W. Thomas became the division chief. His action officer position was upgraded to division chief. Due to PCS, LTC Gary Brewer

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was replaced in July as TENCAP officer by MAJ Mike Fromm. Mr. Dan Smith filled a civilian position in August which had been vacant for several years. Mr. Robert Crittenden, departed and was replaced by Ms. Jessie Hale in September. [REDACTED] Mrs. Joan Adams, the senior secretary, retired. She had worked in DAMI-ISP for over 20 years. She was replaced by Mrs. Sharon Whitton in August. The Army Topographic Programs Officer, MAJ(P) Robert Kirby, was reassigned to WESTCOM in May and was replaced in mid-June by MAJ John Olesak.

d. (U) Human Intelligence Division (DAMI-ISH).

(1) (U) Fiscal year 1985 witnessed significant turnover in the HUMINT Division of both officer and civilian personnel. Particularly noteworthy in this respect was the departure of Ms. Christieann McGurk, who left for a promotion at DIA. Ms. McGurk had spent 24 years in DAMI-ISH, monitoring overt HUMINT collection operations. Her place was assumed by Mr. Richard Seigfreid, who arrived in DAMI-ISH in September 1985 from U.S. Army Operations Group, Fort Meade, Maryland. 1985 also saw the arrival of Mr. Chester Steckel into the Division, replacing Ms. Pat San Millan, who was promoted to a new position with Detachment O, U.S. Army Operations Group.

(2) (U) Among officer personnel, LTC Gerald Fox was replaced by LTC Timothy L. Felker, who arrived in October 1984 from the U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC). LTC Edward J. Lorentzen arrived in DAMI-ISH in March 1985, replacing LTC Carlos Salinas. LTC Lorentzen came to the Division from DIA, Current Branch.

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(3) (U) Finally, over the course of the year seven Army Reservists were assigned to DAMI-ISH as Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). They were:

LTC Lawrence P. Jepson

LTC Frederick R. Stahl, Jr.

LTC Edward J. Wyrsh

MAJ Clyde M. Bryant

MAJ James V. Dixon

MAJ Edward J. Heaton

MAJ Peter T. Means

e. (U) Signals Intelligence Division (DAMI-ISS). A key personnel gain was Mr. Manuel Pablo (March), Chief of the Technical Reconnaissance and Surveillance Program Office. Action officer gains were MAJ Walter J. Wright (June), and CPT Paul G. Wolfe (July). Action officer losses were MAJ Donald Kerrick (April) and LTC Stephen Conrad (June).

3. (U) NARRATIVE OF ACTIVITIES.

a. (U) Directorate of Intelligence Systems (DAMI-IS).

(1) (U) During FY 85, the Directorate again suffered from an unusually heavy turnover of personnel. Most of those leaving had not completed the "normal" three year tour on the Army Staff. This personnel turbulence affected the efficiency and effectiveness of the divisions and placed heavy workloads on the remaining action officers.

(2) (U) This summary mentions only the major actions and programs in which this directorate engaged. It does not account for numerous planning sessions, briefings, PPBES and other meetings, and hours of study and thought brought to bear by the directorate's action officers on the many challenges facing Army intelligence.

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b. (U) Intelligence Systems Integration Division (DAMI-ISI).

(1) (U) The Intelligence Systems Integration Division (DAMI-ISI), as its designation implies, was concerned with the spectrum of intelligence disciplines, and how they interface and are coordinated into a multi-discipline intelligence collection, analysis and production system at tactical and strategic levels. DAMI-ISI engaged in a multitude of staff actions to ensure that commanders were provided the accurate and timely intelligence required to ensure accurate battlefield decisions. Major functional staff responsibilities included doctrine, structure, organizations, and individual, unit and institutional training.

(2) (U) DAMI-ISI assumed primary staff responsibility for intelligence support to Central America (CENTAM), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO). The period saw an increased emphasis on language, Special Operating Forces (SOF) and low intensity conflict (LIC). The division assumed central responsibility for the functional panels associated with the Army Intelligence Management Plan (AIMP).

(3) (U) In FY 85, several key actions were initiated to upgrade the Army Language Program:

(a) (U) Linguist pay was formalized in draft legislation. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) identified \$9.6M for the Army to implement linguist pay in FY 87. At the end of FY 85, the Army was formally coordinating its pay ini-

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tiative with the other Services and beginning to develop political support in Congress.

(b) (U) The Army Language Program Action Plan was developed late in FY 85. It listed issues and actions required to address systemic weakness throughout the language program.

(c) (U) The Army held its first Army Language Program Review Committee (ALPRC) meeting in February 1985. Representatives from the ARSTAF, FORSCOM, INSCOM, MILPERCEN, OCAR and NGB were present.

(d) (U) The Language Program manager helped develop Program Developmental Incremental Package (PDIP) 307P for SOF Language Training, Active Component (AC) SOF contract (in unit) language instructors, and the development of SOF job-specific language texts.

(e) (U) The Language Program Manager, with the support of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, DA, (DAMO-ODSO), developed a SOF language program in August 1985 which called for the identification and coding of SOF language requirements.

(f) (U) The Language Program Manager developed PDIP CP8U, the Army Language Program, to supplement the AC SOF Language Training funds identified in PDIP 307P. CP8U was funded at a level of \$31M from 88-92 and provides exclusively for the hiring of both AC and Reserve Component (RC) language instructors for in-unit language programs.

(g) (U) Pursuant to a directive from the Vice Chief of Staff Army (VCSA) to convert the Army National Guard (ARNG)

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linguist battalion from TDA to TOE, the Language Program Manager tasked USAICS to develop a TOE concept for RC linguist units. The concept was developed of five-man teams, each having one language and one MI skill, which could be CAPSTONED down to the team level to provide linguist augmentation to gaining CINCs upon mobilization. In TAA-92, the Army leadership approved growth of RC linguist units from 390 authorizations to approximately 800.

(4) (U) In October 1984, the REDTRAIN Program Manager, accompanied by the Chief and senior NCO of the REDTRAIN Office, INSCOM, briefed the REDTRAIN Program and held discussions in the Pacific. The INSCOM Theater Intelligence Center - Pacific (ITAC-PAC), Ft Shafter, HI., US Army Western Command (WESTCOM), Ft Shafter, HI., Field Station Kunia, HI., 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI., and 125th MI Bn (CEWI), Schofield Barracks, HI., were included in the schedule.

(5) (U) In November 1984, the REDTRAIN Program review went to the 500th MI GP, Camp Zama, Japan, Asian Studies Detachment, 500th MI GP, Camp Zama, and Field Station Misawa, Japan. The 501st MI GP, Seoul, Korea, 102d MI BN (CEWI), Camp Red Cloud, Korea and Headquarters, Eighth US Army were visited in February 1985.

(6) (U) During the period 5-13 July 1985, Mr. Moore was officially detailed to assist and advise the Aviation Security Office, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Washington,

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D.C. The detail was requested by the FAA because of increased emphasis and expansion of their terrorist intelligence requirements.

(7) (U) The Defense Advanced language and Area Studies Program (DALASP) is a GDIP funded program that provides the opportunity for study programs to develop expertise in third world language and area studies. The program is open to military and civilian intelligence personnel. During FY 85, seven military officers were accepted into DALASP. These personnel are specializing in area studies in Sub-Saharan Africa, India, Middle East countries, and Latin America, and studying the Swahili, Hindi, Arabic, Chinese, Spanish and Portuguese languages.

(8) (U) The ACSI was co-chairman of the DoD University Forum Foreign Language and Area Studies Working Group. During FY 84 the Working Group contracted with the Association of American Universities to present a study on the current status of language and area studies in academe within the United States. The result of this study was presented in FY 85 in a publication entitled "Beyond Growth: The Next Stage in Language and Area Studies." This publication outlines the overall condition of university programs in language and area studies and recommends strategies for strengthening them in order to be able to meet the interests and National needs of our country and Department of Defense.

(9) (U) During the Total Army Analysis (TAA) 92 in August 1985, the ARNG raised an issue requesting that all

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division and below NG divisions and brigades be supported by ARNG CEWI units rather than USAR. A Task Force was formed in September 1985 to study the proposals. At the end of 1985 no changes had been recommended to the original 1984 activation plan although the Task Force was still formed and proposals were still being exercised.

(10) (U) The Joint Space Intelligence and Operations Course (JSIOC) was placed under contract for development. The course was designed for officers, enlisted and civilians, working in positions requiring a knowledge of the relationship of space to intelligence and operations. The course was designed to fill a void in DoD intelligence training. A joint DIA, Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps team developed the concept of the course. A contractor developed the course funded by DIA, Army and Navy. The course was to be turned over to the Air Force Training Command (ATC) in March 1986. The course included space environment (44 hours), and related Intelligence Community structure and processes (35 hours). Based on JSIOC contractor delivery schedule, ATC will be able to provide a limited number of resident (Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, CO) and mobile training team iterations during FY 86.

(11) (U) The Military Intelligence Functional Area Assessment (MI FAA) cycle started on 8 August 1985. The MI FAA was to assess the following units: MI Battalion ((Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence) (CEWI)) (Heavy Division); MI

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Battalion (CEWI) (Light Infantry Division); MI Battalion (Operations) (Corps); MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) (Corps) and Special Security Office (SSO) communications. The MI FAA briefing was scheduled to be presented to the Council of Colonels on 17 October and to the Vice Chief of Staff on 26 November 1985.

(12) (U) The TRADOC-INSCOM Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Echelons Above Corps (EAC) Combat/Training Development, Training and Doctrine Activities was reviewed. A proposed change was transfer of the responsibility for preparation of EAC TOEs, BOIPs, and OOPRIs to the Intelligence School. INSCOM was working on approximately 70 materiel acquisitions which were to be evaluated to determine what the Intelligence Center's role would be within the life cycle management model of these systems. Another proposed change to the MOU provides for an INSCOM liaison officer (LNO) to be assigned to the USAICS Directorate of Combat Developments. Issues requiring further discussion were manpower considerations, overlapping responsibilities with respect to TROJAN, and Low Intensity Conflict.

(13) (U) A strawman of revised Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) doctrine was completed by USAICS. This doctrine incorporated new procedures for analyzing the 3d dimension of the battlefield, airspace, and more extensive procedures for IPB support of offensive operations. Prior IPB

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doctrine did not include such analysis. Lessons learned at the National Training Center (NTC) and during major exercises, such as REFORGER, indicated that current IPB procedures lack the offensive focus required to support Airland Battle doctrine.

(14) (U) The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Limited Operational Test (LOT) was planned to conduct two Force Developmental Test and Experimentations (FDTEs) on ASAS modules. The first FDTE was to be on the ASAS Interface Module (AIM) and the Forward Sensor Interface and Control (FSIC) modules prior to the FSIC/AIM Limited Operational Test (LOT) in FY 86. The second FDTE was to be on the Intelligence Data Processor Communication Processing Interface (IDP/CPI) modules prior to the IDP/CPI LOT in FY 87. A tentative BOIP/OOPRI was completed and forwarded to TRADOC for approval and inclusion in the October 1985 Consolidated TOE Update. This submission would allow for the continued budgeting for the ASAS.

c. (U) Humint Division (DAMI-ISH).

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d. (U) Imagery Intelligence Topography and Meteorology
Division (DAMI-ISP)

(1) (S) The Imagery Intelligence, Topography and
Meteorology Division continued to manage the Army's imagery,
meteorology and topography activities. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The division was also the office within OACSI with
primary responsibility for the Tactical Exploitation of

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National Space Capabilities (TENCAP) program and for all space related issues.

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(5) (U) DAMI-ISP provided the Army representative to the DOD Softcopy Steering Committee. The committee is charged with development and management of strategic level softcopy imagery exploitation systems for DOD. Its primary focus was the overall management of the DOD portion of the IDEX II

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program, a softcopy imagery exploitation system being developed for the intelligence community. The Army had limited participation in this program. The only Army IDEX II capability will be at the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center in Building 213, Washington Navy Yard.

(6) (U) In FY 85, DAMI-ISP began a survey of the imagery exploitation elements within the Army Intelligence Agency to reexamine their requirements for a softcopy imagery exploitation capability. The results of this survey will determine what additional softcopy imagery exploitation capability is required by the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center. It will also be used to determine whether the Foreign Science and Technology Center and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center should participate in the IDEX II program.

(7) (U) DAMI-ISP's contractual effort to produce an Army Imagery Plan, begun in FY 84, was concluded in FY 85. The purpose of the plan is to identify Army imagery needs and provide management actions that will result in the necessary fixes. Several coordination meetings were held where representatives from a variety of MACOM and Army components participated. A draft copy of the plan was sent out for coordination. By the end of FY 85, the final version of the plan was being completed by the contractor.

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(10) (U) DAMI-ISP represented OACSI in the Congressional review of the FY 85 Tactical Imagery Exploitation System (TACIES) funds reprogramming action which continued to be stalled in the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). Support by the Under Secretary of the Army was solicited to convince the SASC to approve the FY 85 reprogramming action. At year end, the action was still stalled in the SASC. DAMI-ISP prepared materials for and participated in briefings to the senior Army leadership concerning the fate of TACIES.

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(12) (U) In April, DIA and ASD(C3I) sponsored the fourth Defense Intelligence Technical Forum (DITFOR IV). Unlike previous forums, this one concentrated on imagery intelligence. The chief of DAMI-ISP presented a briefing on imagery support for the Airland Battle. DAMI-ISP made efforts to have wide Army participation in the forum. Representatives from many Army components and MACOMs attended. The purpose of the forum was to review current imagery programs, identify service and DOD needs, and to obtain information on new technologies.

(13) (U) Prior to the function being transferred to DAMI-ISI in September, DAMI-ISP continued to represent the Army in the Peacetime Reconnaissance Forecast. ISP also provided information on Army intelligence systems (IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT) to the Joint Staff and DOD.

(14) (U) On 5 October, ACSI sent the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) a statement of Army's requirements for digital topographic data. This statement, prepared by the U.S. Army Engineer Topographic Laboratory under the direction of DAMI-ISP, was a landmark event in Army topography and was the first step in developing a program to give Army the terrain data it will require to support operations in the 1990's and beyond.

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(15) (U) DAMI-ISP assisted the Office of the Assistant Chief of Engineers as a co-sponsor of the Seventh Annual Army Topographic Conference held at Fort Belvoir, VA, from 29 through 31 October. Topics solicited from the field were grouped into presentations and a series of workshops. The workshops were on organization, equipment and force structure, innovative techniques and data sources, personnel and training, and future requirements. BG Withers, Deputy Assistant Chief of Engineers, opened the conference; COL Kirby, Chief of the Geography and Computer Science Department at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, was the keynote speaker.

(16) (U) In November, DAMI-ISP announced the designation of FORSCOM as the point of contact for coordinating Army topographic support to the U.S. Southern Command.

(17) (U) During February, DAMI-ISP led a major literature search and writing effort to assemble a draft White Paper on Army Topography for the Assistant Chief of Engineers. Although not subsequently released by the Topographer of the Army, the draft paper strongly influenced subsequent policy trends in topographic support and development of the theme for the next Army Topographic Conference.

(18) (U) In March, as a culmination of work by DAMI-ISP and counterparts from the other Services on the OSD Digital Data Transformation Working Group, OSD announced its policy on transformation of digital MC&G data. This policy requires the

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Services to provide for unique transformations of basic data produced by DMA. Army is the only service with a programmed capability, the Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS), to meet this requirement.

(19) (U) Also in March, DAMI-ISP identified the DTSS to DCSOPS as a major potential exploiter of space-derived imagery and other sensing. This action led to a series of further contacts with the Army Space Initiatives Study (ASIS) Group and eventually to high visibility of the DTSS in the Army's concept of how it will exploit space.

(20) (U) During the POM development cycle from May through July, DAMI-ISP led an Army action which argued for protection of the cost of the DMA modernization program at the short-term expense of ongoing production. Army and the other services also declined to decrement their respective POMs to restore funding to DMA. This led to a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) issued by OSD(C3I) on 25 August which partially restored previously reduced DMA funding and stated that, henceforth, the services would be required to program the production costs of unique MC&G products needed in support of emerging weapons systems. DAMI-ISP represented the Army at subsequent meetings to develop an implementation plan for the PDM. Previously stated Army requirements for generic data sets to support many systems and programs should reduce the impact of this action.

(21) (U) In August, the Assistant Chief of Engineers established the Army Topographic Engineering Coordinating

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Committee in order to provide a mechanism for coordinating Army topographic initiatives and providing feedback on the needs of the Army in the area of topographic operations. The Chief, DAMI-ISP, is a committee member and represents OACSI at the regularly scheduled quarterly meetings.

(22) (U) DAMI-ISP continued to work with DMA to ensure that the Army's stated needs for digital topographic data were properly understood and realistically addressed. The requested data sets were renamed Tactical Terrain Data (TTD) and Special Terrain Data (STD) to avoid confusion with standard DMA digital products.

(23) (U) DAMI-ISP sponsored the Eighth Annual Topographic Conference at Fort Belvoir, VA, from 30 September to 2 October. The conference focused exclusively on digital topography and was attended by more than 200 individuals from Army units and organizations worldwide. MG Rosenberg, DMA Director, and MG Dacey, Assistant Chief of Engineers, presented overviews of the DMA and Army roles in digital mapping. LTG Weinstein, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, gave the keynote address which focused on topographic support to the commander.

(24) (U) The Jet Propulsion Laboratory Arroyo Center completed a study titled "Weather and Environmental Effects Intelligence Needs and Methods." The study used extensive surveys across the full spectrum of Army functions and organizations. The analysis of the surveys resulted in several

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major findings, a series of charts and diagrams, and seven recommendations. The study revalidated the need for weather effects intelligence and discovered that Army units are not trained or equipped to collect weather data or develop weather effects intelligence. The study found that the technology exists to satisfy weather observing and intelligence shortfalls. The problem that the study could not address was how to implement the recommendations in an integrated fashion.

(25) (U) The TRADOC Weather Environmental Support (TWESO) located at Ft Leavenworth, KS, was programmed to move to the Army Intelligence Center and School so that resources could be more effectively used. The TWESO responsibilities and personnel will be moved during the first and second quarter of FY 86. The pending move held up the ISP major revision of three weather regulations.

(26) (U) Weather and environmental effects in the Army are becoming more visible. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence recognized the need for a forum to develop aggressive programs to enhance the weather support to the Army. Planning and funding for the Army's first weather conference began. The conference will be in the Washington, DC area during the second quarter of FY 86.

(27) (U) DAMI-ISP prepared a statement of work and coordinated the contractual negotiations for a Congressionally directed procurement and test of a tactical weather intelligence system. Contract negotiations were suspended in July

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when the legal staff of the Defense Supply Service-Washington and the contractor could not agree on the legality of a contingency fee arrangement between the primary contractor and subcontractor. Coordination to rebuild the system began.

(28) (U) FY 85 Weather Support Costs and Personnel.*

Observations	\$11,215,000	364
Predictions	3,508,000	0
Dissemination	1,288,000	0
System Support	<u>17,644,000</u>	<u>23</u>
Total	\$33,655,000	387

*The Federal Plan for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research.

e. (U) Signals Intelligence Division (DAMI-ISS).

(1) (U) The actions conducted by the SIGINT Division during FY 85 were focused on four primary areas: planning and managing a broad scope of innovative projects and programs to measurably increase capabilities of tactical SIGINT equipment and dramatically increase the skill level of tactical SIGINT personnel; coordinating representation of Army requirements in National level fora; placing Army personnel in key positions to achieve maximum utilization of National resources; and seeking technical sensors for measurement and signature data collection.

(2) (U) Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation System (PPBES) Team.

(a) (U) Continuing Functions. The team served as the Department of the Army focal point for signals intelligence policy, plans, programs, and operations. It also participated

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in Army and Intelligence Community sponsored studies which support the development of new systems or capabilities, and represented the Army at DCI-level committee meetings. The team provided the Army member for the following major fora:

(1) (U) The DCI SIGINT Committee.

(2) [REDACTED]

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(3) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is a permanent subcommittee, under the DCI SIGINT Committee, responsible for receipt, approval, and subsequent generation of intelligence guidance in response to tasks to be levied on national resources. The SORS continually monitors requirements and provides collection and processing guidance for both long and short term needs.

(4) (U) Representation to the Program Manager of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), for the purpose of

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program development and review, and budget formation, justification and defense. The goal is to ensure that Army interests are properly and adequately addressed.

(5) [REDACTED]

SIUS552 (U) (1)

(b) (U) Major Projects.

(1) (U) Army Manning for OCMC. A community memorandum of understanding for manning a collection management center of National resources was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence in January 1985. In response to HQDA request, INSCOM acquired four Army spaces for the OCMC and placed them on the CONUS MI Group TDA. A request for a fifth space is pending. Two of the spaces were filled in March 1985. Physical space limits in the OCMC prevented the filling of the other spaces.

(2) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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(3) (U) TRUE BLUE. In November 1984, by memorandum of understanding between the NSA and the INSCOM, the TRUE BLUE program was recognized and expanded. the purpose of the program is to place Army elements at selected field activities to provide a dedicated peacetime mechanism for supporting Army commanders which can be transitioned by war. By the end of FY 85, Army ELINT analyst support consisted of [REDACTED] 98Js spread across four of the nine assignment sites. Plans call for the assignment of [REDACTED] 98Js by June 1987.

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(4) [REDACTED]

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(5) (U) Wartime Reserve Modes (WARM). -The WARM Committee, chartered by the National ELINT Group in 1983, completed its task and published a position paper in March 1985. The Committee had studied the extent of WARM, gathered available data, assessed the potential impact on intelligence, operations, and research and development, and made recommendations for follow-on action. A lot of information, problems, and potential solutions were shared in the three WARM workshops which the committee hosted. The workshops were attended by operators, collectors, intelligence analysts, and engineers.

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(7) (U) In late 1984, a blue ribbon panel was formed to study NSA and Service Cryptologic Elements (SCEs) relationships. The panel report resulted in the Director, NSA, directing the formation of a Senior Council to address specific policy problems identified in the panel report. MG Soyster, INSCOM Commander, represents the Army on the Senior Council.

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(8) (C)

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(3) (U) The Technical Reconnaissance and Surveillance
TECRAS TEAM.

(a)

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(3) [REDACTED]

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(4) (U) The Military Support Team.

(a) (U) The Military Support Team interacted throughout the year with the MACOMs, Corps, and tactical Army elements through TDYs, hosting visits, messages, and phone calls. the team used meetings, briefings, and information papers to maintain close contact with other Army staff elements, other service staff, Army agencies, especially INSCOM, and National intelligence agencies, particularly NSA. Members of the team were very involved in the projects listed below and other

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activities, all of which are focused on tactical SIGINT support.

(h) (U) Major Problems.

(1)

[REDACTED]

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(2)

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(3) [REDACTED]

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(4) (U) IMPROVED GUARDRAIL V. A second Improved GUARDRAIL V (I-GRV) has been deployed to USAREUR, (2d MI Battalion (AE), 2075h MI Group (CEWI). the I-GRV is an improved COMINT/DF system that is the core system for the 1990's GUARDRAIL COMMON SENSOR.

(5) (U) CORPS IEW UAV. A Required Operational Capability (ROC) for a Corps Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was approved and the decision made to proceed as a non-developmental item (NDI). This was in the Army's initial effort at acquiring a survivable airborne intelligence collection system for future lethal battlefields.

(6) [REDACTED]

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(7) [REDACTED]

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SECTION 3

DIRECTORATE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (U) OVERVIEW. The Counterintelligence Directorate is administratively divided into three separate divisions with the responsibilities of Security, Counterintelligence Operations, and Technology Transfer/Foreign Disclosure. Although they operate as individual elements, their functions and responsibilities are related and they work together to accomplish a diverse mission.

a. (U) Security Division. The primary functional responsibility of the Security Division is to develop, publish, monitor, and guide security policy in the various sub-disciplines, i.e., Information, Personnel, and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). The Security Review and Freedom of Information mission provides a security service to the Army Staff and the public. The litigation functions involve coordination on all litigation matters that deal with Army Intelligence. During FY 85, major programs and related regulations were revised as necessary and guidance was continuously being disseminated to Army field elements. The number of actions processed this FY increased substantially in all sections of the Division. The trend is expected to continue. A further increase in the workload of the Division in FY 85 was caused by the extra detail and effort required on several actions relating to sensitive issues which came to national public attention.

b. (U) Counterintelligence Operations Division. The primary functional responsibility of the Counterintelligence

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Operations Division is to develop, publish, monitor, and guide policy regarding the U.S. Army counterintelligence activities, foreign counterintelligence programs, automation security, communications security, special access programs, counterterrorism, and technical surveillance countermeasures. During FY 85, increased attention was given to the support of special access programs, as well as to the counterterrorism effort. The trend towards stronger emphasis in both areas is expected to continue.

c. (U) Technology Transfer Division. The Technology Transfer Division, as the focal point on the Army Staff for technology transfer actions and policy issues, coordinates the Army's efforts in support of the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the Commodity Control List, the Munitions List, and the Military Critical Technologies List. Division personnel participate in the munitions and strategic trade case review process, evaluate bilateral and multilateral co-development and co-production agreements, submit all Army originated requests for exception to the National Disclosure Policy, and adjudicate foreign requests for visits, documents and personnel accreditations. During FY 85, increased emphasis was placed on the Technology Transfer Security Program in response to the increasing number of Army international programs. This emphasis is expected to continue.

2. (U) MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES.

a. (U) Director's Office.

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(1) (U) Colonel Anthony J. Gallo, Jr. was the Director during all of FY 85.

(2) (U) The position of Executive Officer was deleted in December 1984. Major Robert A. Harding, the incumbent, was transferred to the Technology Transfer Division. Although CW2 James E. Ellett, Security Division, was declared excess, he was transferred to the Directors Office and continued to serve in the capacity of Executive Officer.

(3) (U) In March 1985, Melissa Johnson was hired as one of the directorate clerk-typists. Linda Price was transferred to the Counterintelligence Operations Division.

(4) (U) In April 1985, Crystal Lee was hired as an additional clerk-typist.

b. (U) Security Division.

(1) (U) Key personnel incumbent during all of FY 85 were as follows:

(a) (U) Mr. Frank Dill, Division Chief, January 1976 - present.

(b) (U) Mr. Joseph C. Pell, Personnel Security, 1 February 1977 - present.

(c) (U) Mr. Walter A. Mestre, Personnel Security, 20 June 1982 - present.

(d) (U) Mr. George J. Bromwell, Security Review, 21 January 1979 - present.

(e) (U) Ms. Patricia Shea, Security Review, 22 May 1983 - present.

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(f) (U) Mr. Carl L. Bjorkman, Information Security, 9 March 1979 - present.

(g) (U) Ms. Rene T. Davis-Harding, Information Security, 22 February 1983 - present.

(h) (U) Mr. Fred Wirth, Sensitive Compartmented Information Policy, 6 September 1983 - present.

(i) (U) Mr. James D. Passarelli, Security Awareness, Education and Training, 5 November 1983 - present.

(2) (U) Ms. Fran McGowan departed the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Policy Section on 10 May 1985. She was replaced by Ms. Claudia Smith on 28 July 1985. As a result of the untimely death of Mr. Roger R. Pierce, FOIA/PA/Litigation, he was replaced by Mr. James Seino on 16 September 1985. One of the military positions in the FOIA/PA/Litigation area was civilianized and Mr. Ralph Johnson was placed in the position on 1 June 1985. The military incumbent in the position, CW2 James H. Ellett, was reassigned as Executive Officer to the Director, Counterintelligence, in January 1985. CPT Trudie E. Thompson, FOIA/PA/Litigation, resigned her commission and departed in December 1984.

c. (U) Counterintelligence Operations Division.

(1) (U) Key personnel incumbent during all of FY 85 were as follows:

(a) (U) LTC Peter A. Vinett, 28 June 1982 - present.

(b) (U) Mr. Ronald L. Fann, 1 July 1981 - present.

(c) (U) SFC Robert J. Greenwood, 15 June 1982 - present.

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(d) (U) Mr. Ted Snediker, November 1984 - present.

(e) (U) Ms. Udine Coletta, 14 February 1982 - present.

(f) (U) MAJ Jack Freeman, 1 August 1983 - present.

(2) (U) Key personnel changes during FY 85. On 5 June 1984, Mr. Frank Aurelio departed as the Division Chief. LTC Peter A. Vinett acted as Division Chief until 27 September 1985 when Mr. Ronald L. Fann assumed the position of Division Chief. During FY 85, LTC Preston L. Funkhouser, Terrorism Policy Staff Officer, was reassigned to Fort Bragg, NC. He was replaced by LTC James Robinson who left this position to become the Chief of CI Directorate's Technology Transfer Division. Following LTC Robinson's departure, LTC John V. Lewin moved to DAMI-CI from DAMI-FL and assumed this position. MAJ (P) Richard Armstrong, the Counterintelligence Operations Officer responsible for doctrinal matters, battlefield deception, and counterintelligence support to operations security, departed for reassignment to Fort Hood, TX. His position was cut in a staff reduction action before the end of the fiscal year. LTC (P) Michael Hemovich, the Special Plans officer, was reassigned to DIA and replaced by LTC Paul A. Pelletier. Mr. Thomas D. Howard also joined the Special Operations Team to work in the areas of special access programs and DAIG findings. MAJ (P) James L. Simmons, Signal Security Staff Officer, departed for reassignment to JCS. Mr. Ralph Neeper, who handled accreditation actions for automated information systems departed for assignment to the U.S. Army Management

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Systems Support Agency. He was replaced by Mrs. Bernice Boykin. Mr. Paul O'Connell filled the newly authorized OFCO/DCE Policy Staff Officer position on the Special Operations Team. Mr. Mark Randol began a two year counterintelligence internship in November 1984. SFC Jackie E. Smith was assigned to the division in February 1985 with specific duties in the terrorism policy arena.

(3) (U) Organizational changes.

(a) (U) During FY 85, the name of the division was changed from CI/OPSEC Division to Counterintelligence Operations Division concurrent with a reorganization into a team structure. The Special Operations Team was created with Mr. Ted Snediker designated as Team Chief, the Counterintelligence Operations Team was created with LTC Vinett designated as Team Chief, and the Automation Security Team was created with MAJ (P) Freeman as Team Chief.

(b) (U) The Special Operations Team was structured to encompass CI support to Army special access programs (SAP), defensive and offensive counterespionage, special plans, battlefield deception, monitorship of CI production, and the OACSI focal point for OACSI related findings arising from the DAIG special inspection of procurement. During the year, the SAP area expanded to include acting as the OACSI focal point for intelligence support to the DA SAP Oversight Committee for assistance to Army MACOMs in resolving SAP-peculiar intelligence problems, and the primary OACSI point of interface with the DA Technology Management Office.

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(c) (U) In October 1984, three spaces were reprogrammed in the Army Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Program to support the Counterintelligence Operations Division. One position provided staff augmentation to the Special Operations Team through assignment of a Staff Policy Officer responsible for offensive counterintelligence operations/defensive counterespionage matters. This position is a Great Skills position in the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command with duty at the Counterintelligence Directorate, OACSI. The two remaining positions were an E-8 Terrorism Policy Staff NCO and an O-4 Terrorism Policy Staff Officer.

d. (U) Technology Transfer Division.

(1) (U) Key personnel incumbent during FY 85 were as follows:

(a) (U) LTC James R. Robinson, Division Chief, 19 December 1984 - present.

(b) (U) LTC David A. Bell, Technology Control Officer, 22 February 1984 - present.

(c) (U) Mr. Fred E. Mannke, Policy and Programs, 22 February 1983 - present.

(d) (U) LTC Robert G. Myers, Policy Officer, 10 October 1984 - present.

(e) (U) MAJ (P) Robert A. Harding, Technology Control Officer, 1 November 1984 - present.

(f) (U) MAJ (P) Michael D. Humenik, Technology

Officer, 12 July 1985 - present.

(g) (U) Mr. Kenneth C. Raymer, Security Specialist, 18 March 1985 - present.

(2) (U) Key personnel changes. COL Lance R. Cornine, Division Chief since 18 July 1983, departed for INSCOM on 19 December 1984. He was temporarily replaced by LTC Gary E. Brosch until 21 July 1985. LTC Brosch retired and was replaced by LTC (P) Robinson.

3. (U) NARRATIVE OF ACTIVITIES.

a. (U) Director's Activities. During FY 85, Colonel Gallo continued his efforts to expand Army CI involvement in Intelligence Community counterintelligence efforts through active participation in National and DoD CI activities. He represented the Army as principal member of the DCI's Security Committee, the Intergovernmental Counterintelligence Committee chaired by FBI's Judge Webster, the Intergovernmental Countermeasures Committee chaired by General Stilwell, DUSD(P), the Defense Counterintelligence Board, and the National OPSEC Advisory Committee. In order to enhance interface with CI elements in the field, COL Gallo performed field visits to Europe (650th MI Group, USAREUR, 66TH MI Group, USCOB) in October 1984 and the Pacific (WESTCOM, 500th MI Group, 501st MI Group, USARJ, and UNC/EUSA/USFK) in May 1985.

b. (U) Security Division.

(1) (U) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Privacy Act (PA) and Litigation (LIT).

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(a) (U) 115 FOIA, 22 PA and 32 mandatory declassification review actions were processed. Thirty-two other actions (i.e., LIT cases, Congressional inquiries, etc) were also processed.

(b) (U) The Secretary of the Army on 20 February 1985 directed the formation of an Army Task Force to assist the Department of the Justice (DOJ) in its investigation into the whereabouts of the infamous Dr. Josef Mengele, and his association with the U.S. Army in leaving Europe and resettling in South America. DAMI-CIS(L) was heavily involved in this project. Mr. Frank Dill, Chief, Security Division, was named to the U.S. Army Task Force to assist the DOJ. The U.S. Army Investigative Records Repository, Fort Meade, Maryland, was found to be in possession of over 118 reels of microfilm on intelligence files from Europe. Over 380 boxes of files pertaining to the Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) and the U.S. Army Intelligence Training Center were located in the Washington National Records Center, Washington, DC. All of this material was painstakingly searched in a massive project of approximately 6 months duration. Over 138,961 card files were contained within the microfilm reels, and where appropriate, these film titles were added to the computerized Defense Central Index of Investigation during the Mengele Project. In addition, 200 boxes of records concerning U.S. Forces, and Austria, were also searched. The project continued throughout FY 85 and well into FY 86. In short, the CI Directorate, OACSI,

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played a major role in the massive Army search for records pertaining to Dr. Josef Mengele.

(c) (U) On 28 June 1985, the General Accounting Office (GAO) submitted their report titled, "Nazis and Axis Collaborators Were Used to Further U.S. Anti-Communist Objectives in Europe--Some emigrated to the United States" to the Congress. This report stopped short of criticizing the Army for using war criminals for intelligence purposes given the dire need for intelligence during the Cold War period of post WW II. Inasmuch as most of the files reviewed by GAO were Army intelligence files, both DAMI-CIS(L) and the FOIA/PA office at Fort Meade, MD, were an integral part of the GAO effort by performing declassification reviews of pertinent records and responding to GAO interrogatories concerning the reasons and conditions under which the Army used certain Nazi personalities after WW II. The results of this report were well received.

(2) (U) Security Review Section. To insure proper classification prior to release to Congress and/or the public, this section processed over 12,498 requests for security review. The requests entailed the reading of approximately 82,756 pages of material, an increase of 5,828 pages over the previous year.

(3) (U) Security Awareness and Education Program. During FY 85, OACSI's security education program manager continued his oversight/inspection (O/I) program of the Major Command/Army Staff Agency Security Education Programs. Seventeen

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O/I were completed. Follow-up action was taken on completed FY 84 O/I. Plans were made to initiate phase 2 of the O/I program during FY 86 to measure the quality of annual security refresher briefings by attending briefings presented by MACOM/ARSTAF Security Managers. He continued his association with the DCI Security Committee's Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee(SAES), assuming the chairmanship in April 85, and led the preparations for the second annual week-long Security Educators' Seminar at the FBI Academy, Quantico, VA. Additional chairmanship responsibilities/accomplishments included preparation of strawmen for a DCI initiative to counter damage to the national security from the disclosure of classified information to unauthorized individuals.

(4) (U) Information Security.

(a) (U) On behalf of the Army, the ACSI sponsored the Department of Defense Security Luncheon on 7 November at the Bolling Air Force Base Officer's Club. The luncheons are held quarterly to foster better communication within the Federal Government security community, and are sponsored on a rotating basis among the DoD components. Ms. R. T. Davis-Harding acted as the Luncheon Coordinator. BG James W. Shufelt, COL Anthony J. Gallo, Jr., Mr. Frank Dill, and Mr. Carl Bjorkman served as official Army hosts of the event. Mr. Joseph L. Tierney, Section Chief, Intelligence Division, FBI, was the keynote speaker on the subject. "Espionage - No Agency is Immune". Music was provided during the Luncheon by the Army Band and two interesting displays

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of Military Intelligence history were provided by the Army Historian. With close to 300 security management attendees from agencies government-wide, the Army sponsored DoD luncheon boasted the largest attendance yet attained at such an event.

(b) (U) On 19 November 1984, Mr. Carl Bjorkman was selected as the ACSI representative for an Action Officer Working Group tasked by the Director of the Army Staff to review procedures for dissemination of classified messages and creation of AIGs to determine whether distribution could be reduced. The Group selected ODCSOPS for review, because their cables section operates 24-hours per day and handles the largest volume of classified message traffic on the Army Staff. The final report, submitted to the Director of the Army Staff, found that fully 50% of classified message traffic distributed within ODCSOPS could be eliminated. The report recommended a complete review of all Army Staff Agency AIGs be conducted by a similar working group.

(c) (U) The FY 85 DA Security Managers Conference was hosted by the CI Directorate, OACSI, during 22-26 April 1985 at Headquarters, INSCOM, Arlington Hall Station. Mr. Carl Bjorkman planned and conducted the week-long conference which was the first to be held since 1980. The conference provided a forum for discussion of new DoD and DA information, industrial, intelligence and personnel security requirements, and a variety of topics of general interest presented by many guest speakers.

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An estimated 60 security managers from DA activities world-wide attended. All agreed the conference was the highlight of 1985.

(d) (U) On 28 February 1985, The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) directed that all Military Departments and DoD Agencies immediately implement the requirement contained in National Security Decision Directive No. 84, requiring all personnel to execute a nondisclosure statement reaffirming their intention to protect classified information as a condition of access. In response to the directive, Ms. R. Davis-Harding developed DA Circular 380-85-1, Department of the Army Implementing Instructions for the Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement, SF 189, dated 15 July 1985. The Army Circular was the first publication implementing the Directive, and remains the model for programs within other government agencies.

(e) (U) On 20 March 1985, Ms. R. Davis-Harding issued an OACSI policy letter concerning the effect of the implementation of OMB Circular A-76, Commercial Activities, on security functions which involve access to classified information. The intent of the Commercial Activities Program is to contract government functions which may be performed more economically by industry. Concerns had frequently been expressed by Army elements that many sensitive and inherently governmental security functions were being contracted. The OACSI 20 March letter acknowledged the risk inherent in contracting security activities which involve significant, uncontrolled contractor access to all-source intelligence and other classified information. The purpose of the

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letter was to distinguish the unique requirements of security functions from others. OACSI policy guidance, and a synopsis of exemptions granted on the basis of an unacceptable risk to national security was also provided. The policy letter was the first step in ensuring security and resource managers addressed the security requirements of Commercial Activities studies.

(5) (U) SCI Policymaking.

(a) (U) Background: Over 240 hours of effort were expended in support of five Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) subcommittees and working groups and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) staff on SCI policy matters. This effort was in addition to time expended on Army regulations (ARs).

(b) (U) Results:

1 (U) Between July and the end of FY 85, DIA distributed three new DoD SCI administrative security manuals. In August, the new ACSI issued policy changes regarding SCI access authorizations which were promptly implemented by a message supplement to DoD C-5105.21-M-1.

2 (U) In March 1985, AR 380-38 (Army Privacy Communications System) (PCOMS) was staffed Army-wide. Action was then suspended at the request of the DAIG based on an on-going investigation. DAIG subsequently submitted policy changes. The first draft of the AR was submitted to TAGO in July 1985. After revision, TAGO sent the final draft to the publisher. In September 1985, the final galley proof was returned to TAGO.

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Over 160 man-hours of effort were expended on this AR during FY 85.

3 (U) In November 1984, the U.S. Army Information Systems Command (USAISC) requested a major policy change to the draft of AR 380-28 (Army Special Security Office (SSO) System). USAISC's concern was over operational control of USAISC communicators by U.S. Army Special Security Group (USSSG) Special Security Offices (SSOs). This issue was resolved in April 1985, and the AR was edited and sent to TAGO in July. After several sessions with TAGO editors and subsequent revisions, the final draft was submitted as FY 85 ended. An estimated 160 man-hours of effort were expended on AR 380-28.

4 (U) A draft of AR 380-35, to implement DoD C-5105.21-M-1, was prepared and staffed. Most comments were received and the draft revised by May. However, the SCI action officer was promoted and left for a new job and as FY 85 ended had not been replaced. With the SCI Policy Section at 50 percent staffing, only limited piecemeal editing of the AR was done when actions of the AR 380-28 and AR 380-38 permitted. Estimate approximately 200 man-hours of effort were expended on AR 380-35.

(6) (U) SCI-Security Doctrine and Training.

(a) (U) Background: Based on research and investigation of a void in SCI communications doctrine in FY 84 and FY 85, it became apparent that a similar void existed in doctrine for Special Security Office (SSO) operations. In November 1984, TRADOC was requested to publish Army field manuals

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(FMs) on SCI support provided by the DA SSO System. Currently, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) began development of a formal course of instruction for Army Special Security Officers.

(b) (U) Results:

1 (U) Provided comments to HQ U.S. Army Special Security Group (USASSG) in coordinating training tasks for USAICS SSO training. Initial courses started in April 1985 and were considered a good first effort. However, courses had a significant shortcoming: Training was limited to officers and did not include Army NCOs being assigned to SSO duties. This is a major shortcoming since intelligence trained or qualified enlisted personnel are not being used in SSO duties.

(c) (U) In September and October 1985, the SME was TDY in Washington interviewing OACSI, INSCOM, DIA, NSA, and others SCI policy and SSO officials. DAMI-CIS SCI policy specialists provided input and escorted the SME on a number of visits. Initial research efforts noted that SCI support operations and USAIC's SSO training are not documented by a TRADOC SSO Operational Concept which must be written and approved.

(7) (U) SCI Communications.

(a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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(b) (U) Results: Efforts started in FY 84 to provide tactical EAC SCI communications continued but with little substantive results.

1 (U) In November 1984, USAISC prepared a first draft of an SCI Communications Operational Concept. DAMI-CIS provided recommended changes. However, USAISC never completed action on the concept.

2 (U) In December 1984, an ACSI letter prepared by DAMI-CIS, requested that ACSIM assume DA staff propriety for a USAREUR Army Remedial Action Plan (ARAP) and for development of doctrine for EAC SCI communications doctrine. In August 1985, OACSIM concurred in this request.

3 (U) In June 1985, USAICS requested that TRADOC assume the combat developer responsibility for support of tactical EAC SCI communications requirements. TRADOC, in turn tasked the Signal Center, Fort Gordon, to take action on the urgent requirement for tactical EAC SCI communications.

4 (U) FY 85 ended with no further actions or progress in resolving tactical EAC SCI communications issues.

(8) (U) Personnel Security Section.

(a) (U) Continued ongoing activities of the

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Personnel Security Subcommittee of the DCI Security Committee (SECOM). This action included coordination with other National level agencies in conducting periodic adjudicator seminars under the sponsorship of the DCI.

(b) (U) Continued to provide Personnel Security Program oversight of the U.S. Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF).

(c) (U) Continued as a member of the U.S. Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (ANCMR).

(d) At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, instituted an across the board ten percent reduction in security clearances for the total Army.

(e) (U) Participated in the Third Behavioral Science/Personnel Security Symposium at CIA. Proposals presented for consideration were exit interviews of personnel in critical sensitive positions who had become suitability failures, research and interviews of convicted spies, and an interagency cooperative study to examine types of human failures.

(f) (U) Conducted briefings at seven CONUS installations for the purpose of motivating installations to greater participation in the "Catch-'EM in CONUS" Program. This program operates on the basis of identifying soldiers who are scheduled for departure to OCONUS assignments within 60 days to insure initiation of required personnel security investigations.

(g) (U) Processed 215 appeals from individuals who

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appealed the denial/revocation of a security clearance/SCI eligibility decision by the U.S. Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CFF).

c. (U) CI Operations Division.

(1) (U) On 15 November 1984, AR 380-53, Communications Security Monitoring was published culminating a three year effort to get major policy changes distributed to field elements. The regulation completely revised COMSEC monitoring policies and procedures. AR 380-53 now applies to all Army telecommunications and all Army elements world-wide. Commanders at all levels must inform their personnel of the new policy. Commanders of organizations that have COMSEC monitoring personnel must follow more specific procedures for monitoring, maintenance, reporting, and training.

(2) (U) During FY 85, the Internal Control Review Program (Fraud, Waste and Abuse) continued. One new vulnerability assessment was prepared in the area of information security. An evaluation was made of which Army regulations for which the Counterintelligence Directorate was proponent required Internal Control Review checklists. The first draft checklists were projected to be completed by the end of the second quarter of FY 86.

(3) (U) With the loss of the Counterintelligence Operations Officer position, primary membership on the National OPSEC Committee passed from DAMI-CIC to DAMO-ODSO.

(4) (U) During FY 85, the Army of Excellence (AOE) decisions of the Army leadership were implemented. There was a

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48% across the board decrement in 97G Signal Security Specialist positions. This action forced the elimination of the term "SIGSEC", and the development of the Army's Counter SIGINT doctrine. This supplemented the basic Counterintelligence Operational Concept published during the previous fiscal year. The finalized version was projected for publication in FM 34-62 (Counter SIGINT) in early FY 86.

(5) (U) In July 1985, a contract was let to Orkand Corporation of Silver Spring, Maryland, for data base update, validation and refinement of the Counterintelligence Resources Allocation Model (CIRAM).

(6) (U) With the loss of the Counterintelligence Operations Officer authorization, responsibility for Counterintelligence Support to OPSEC was passed to the Signal Security Officer as an additional duty. Responsibility for battlefield deception was passed to LTC Pelletier of the Special Operations Team as an additional duty.

(7) (U) The Counterintelligence Operations Division's follow-on action to the Counterintelligence Task Force final report, 25 March 1983, recommendation was influential in the establishment of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army Materiel Command, in January 1985. Acting on an additional recommendation in the same report, the U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity was resourced in the Army FCI Program to establish the Advanced Foreign Counterintelligence Training Center.

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(8) (U) Major changes occurred in TEMPEST National Policy with the publication of National COMSEC Instructions 5004 and 5005. The Army implemented the changes in policy, initially by message in June 1985, while staffing a change to AR 540-4, Compromising Emanations. The primary thrust was in the area of relaxing countermeasures requirements for contractors in CONUS wherein no TEMPEST countermeasures would be taken to protect Automated Information Systems (AIS) processing CONFIDENTIAL information and careful evaluation was directed before applying TEMPEST Countermeasures processing SECRET information. The resultant policy changes were driven by a realistic evaluation of the threat of hostile intelligence service exploitation of classified information through TEMPEST attack.

(9) (U) In March 1985, AR 380-380, Automation Security, was published and distributed.

(10) (U) With the increase in world-wide terrorism, numerous briefings were provided to GO/SES level DA personnel scheduled for overseas TDY.

(11) (U) Activities initiated as a result of the VCSA-directed FAA on terrorism continued in FY 85. Eight of the 90 action items resulting from the FAA were assigned to OACSI for resolution. Members of the division's terrorism section participated in the drafting of a special \$200 million Force Protection Program Development Increment Package.

(12) (U) The Terrorism Policy Officer continued to represent OACSI on the ATTF. During this period the ATTF handled

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a variety of terrorism counteraction policy issues to include drafting the DA Travel Security Policy message. The division also provided intelligence support to the DCSOPS Antiterrorism Operations Cell (ATOC).

(13) (U) The 9001st Military Intelligence Detachment, a Reinforcement Training Unit with an antiterrorism mission, was created. The unit, which has 25 members, is administratively under ARPERCEN, but is operationally controlled by the CI Operations Division. Unit members work on special projects for OACSI and provide antiterrorism training briefings to Guard and Reserve Forces.

(14) (U) On 5 September 1985, the first Army Deception Program Review, mandated by CSA, was held. Principals were the DCSOPS (Chairman), DCSRDA, ACSI, DCG AMC, and CG CAC. The purpose was to assess the status of tactical deception in the Army and map out a plan for the future. DAMI-CIC arranged for FSTC briefing on Soviet deception activities, then briefed on the status of intelligence support to date. Intelligence information documents being developed by ITAC were highlighted. The results of the review were encouraging.

(15) ^U~~(S)~~ Intelligence oversight during this period was devoted primarily to issues arising out of the DA Inspector General Special Inspection of Procurement. Prompted by allegations of fraud and operational impropriety by an ODCSOPS program known as YELLOW FRUIT (U), the DAIG began an inspection of all Army covert and clandestine activities in November 1984. While

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the Intelligence Oversight position within the Directorate was vacant from August 1984 to June 1985, the CI Operations Division provided specialized support to the DAIG team, OTJAG, the Army General Counsel, and the Department of Justice, during this period. Generally this support consisted of advising investigators of intelligence community policies and procedures, which were used as a point of departure when measuring the propriety of YELLOW FRUIT (U) activities. A DAIG finding which criticized an apparent lack of formal oversight procedure applicable to SISCO, Berlin, prompted a complete redraft of the 1978 Attorney General Guidelines governing that activity. These new procedures were staffed and approved within USAREUR, and were undergoing coordination on the ARSTAF at the conclusion of the fiscal year. Upon approval by the Department of Justice, Department of State, and CIA, these procedures will replace the current DOJ policy and Army implementation. A by-product of this activity was the resubordination of SISCO command and control from the USCOB to ODCSI, USAREUR.

(CLASSIFIED BY: Multiple Sources; DECLASSIFY ON: ODAR)

(16) (U) Activities involving SAPs increased dramatically during the year, which saw the creation and evolution of a number of new policies and procedures with respect to the intelligence role in SAPs generally, the CI role in support of the OPSEC process, and the codification of special security policies and procedures for SAPs.

(17) (U) FY 85 carried over the CY 86 as the year of the

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espionage cases were directed against the United States. Most noteworthy was the John Walker espionage ring which was apprehended in May 1985. This case had a very significant impact on all of the military departments including the Army. The counter-intelligence Operations Team was actively involved in supporting analytical efforts to determine vulnerabilities and damage within the Army caused by the passage of intelligence documents and cryptologic information to the Soviet Union by John Walker. A General Officer Working Committee, chaired by the Deputy ACSI, was formed and numerous changes were made within Army communications to reduce vulnerability from Soviet exploitation. The Army resized a number of crypto nets and eliminated others entirely.

(18) (U) The Army Foreign Counterintelligence Program grew by 59 spaces in FY 85 from a base of 528.

d. (U) Technology Transfer Division.

(1) (U) 1985 saw the Army increase emphasis on the Technology Transfer (T2) Security Program. The application of a T2 decision architecture to the increasing number of Army international programs was proven a success. Army Staff (ARSTAF) and major command (MACOM) program managers successfully applied the decision framework to a number of major Army systems.

(2) (U) The Technology Transfer Division recognized a requirement for developing some fifty-seven major systems technical assessments. Although the validity of well developed technical assessments was demonstrated, they are not an end in

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themselves. The larger issue involved in the releasability decision process concerns the incorporation of the technical assessments in a comprehensive disclosure plan. The Army program manager is thereby able to identify major subsystems and develop a disclosure schedule that prioritizes potential release to security assistance customers.

(3) (U) In March 1985, HQDA letter 70-85-1, International Technology Transfer was published. The DA letter is an implementation of DoD Directive 2040.2, International Transfer of Technology, Good, Services, and Munitions. The HQDA letter has a two year extendable life. Work began on Army Regulation 380.XX which will supersede the HQDA letter.

(4) Mr. Mannke continued to serve as the Chairman of the four country security and technology transfer working group (STTWG) in support of the Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, Terminal Guidance Warhead development effort. The charter of the group is to develop security procedures that are acceptable to the four participants: the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany. During fiscal year 1985, the Technology Transfer Division handled the following workload:

(a) (U) Processed 38 exceptions to the National Disclosure Policy (NDP).

(b) (U) Revealed 304 munitions cases (export license requests).

(c) (U) Processed 1,583 documents requests from foreign governments.

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(d) (U) Processed 12,800 visit requests from foreign governments.

(e) (U) Approved 723 accreditations of foreign officers to U.S. activities.

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SECTION 4

DIRECTORATE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

1. (U) Threat Intelligence Division.

a. (U) The establishment of the Army Intelligence Agency and the reorganization of the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence resulted in the elimination of the Foreign Intelligence and Threat Management Division, the redesignation of the Scientific and Technical Division as a branch, and the creation of the Threat Intelligence Division. The new division has three branches: Threat Integration, Scientific and Technical Intelligence, and Exploitation and Application. It has assumed responsibility for threat policy, threat integration, and production policy and oversight for the Army.

b. (U) Late in the year the mission of the Exploitation and Application Branch was refocused to provide OACSI with the capability to better monitor and coordinate the development and application of dynamic and static threat assessments. This involved the use of models and scenarios in support of Army force, doctrine and combat development studies and analyses.

c. (U) Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch.

(1) (U) In addition to foreign scientific and technical intelligence and threat support to the Army Staff, the Secretariat, and Congress, the members of the S&T Branch participated in a number of Threat Coordinating Groups (TCG), served as the alternate Army representative to the Weapon and

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Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC), served as members of several subcommittees of the WSSIC, participated in three international forums, (Senior National Representatives, Allied Land Warfare Technical Intelligence Conference, and the US/UK Chemical Warfare Intelligence Exchange), served as a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and as a member of a national level intelligence collection/analysis committee on Soviet tank development.

(2) (U) S&T Branch members also conducted technical reviews of several National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) and served as members of numerous Study Advisory Groups (SAG). Branch members prepared and delivered numerous technical briefings to the Secretary of the Army, the Under Secretary of the Army, the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and to a wide range of Army Staff principals.

(3) (U) S&T Branch members also contributed through threat data books for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition (DCSRDA). All functional areas (armor, infantry, artillery, chemical and biological, missiles, aviation, and technology transfer) were addressed. The book is prepared annually for the DCSRDA in support of his preparation for the House Armed Services Committee, House Appropriations Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, and the Senate Appropriations Committee procurement hearings.

(4) (U) FY 35 marked the initial sighting of reactive armor on Soviet tanks in the Groups of Soviet Forces, Germany,

(GSFG). The Scientific and Technical Branch of OACSI's threat Intelligence Division led an effort that culminated in agreed-to positions within the Intelligence Community on a series of related developments. Army remained the lead Service in this critical area of intelligence interest.

(5) (U) The S&T Branch took the lead in clarifying for OSD several issues related to the methods and techniques Soviet attack helicopters use to fire anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). The action, which supported a follow-on discussion with the Secretary of Defense, involved thorough coordination between several commands in Europe, the National Security Agency and the Defense and Army Intelligence Agencies.

(6) (U) OACSI, via the S&T Branch, coordinated all the intelligence and threat issues associated with the Biological Defense Functional Area Assessment and the Chemical Systems Program Review sponsored by the DCSOPS and the US Army Chemical School and Center, respectively. This was the initial complete integration of DA Staff intelligence and threat support to chemical and biological warfare developments in the Army.

d. (U) Exploitation and Application (E&A) Branch.

(1) (U) During FY 85, the E&A Branch performed its general mission of integrating all-source intelligence into a comprehensive and continuing assessment of Soviet/USWP threat and ensuring its timely and consistent application in support of Army force/combat development studies and analysis. FY 85

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was a time of transition for the Branch as it evolved from its previous character as a semi-independent Red Team to the E&A Branch subordinate to the Threat Intelligence Division.

(2) (U) In November 1984, Branch personnel were tasked to support a DIA project on the Soviet correlation-of-forces assessment methodology. Mr Salisbury was detailed to DIA for this effort for several months. After participating in the development of SCORES Europe V at TRADOC in FY 83, the need was recognized for a standard theater operational concept for use both at TRADOC and at CAA as a startpoint for scenario development. The confluence of the joint OACSI-DIA work, emerging intelligence evidence on Soviet strategy and this recognized need for an Army standard led to the development of the OACSI Base Case Scenario for the Western TVD. This was published in December 1985 as a supplement to VOL V of the SBDP. Preliminary application by TRADOC and CAA began late in FY 85.

(3) (U) Major projects/studies supported during FY 85 included TRADOC's preliminary work on Europe VI standard scenario and final work on Southwest Asia I standard scenario; coordination with TRASANA on the Vector-in-command Model review; continued development and application of the Soviet Analytical Model (SAM) by LTC Don Lutz, Mathematics Professor at University of Wisconsin and Mr Neal Siebert; and final preparation of the aforementioned OACSI Base Case Scenario for

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the Western TVD. Threat support and participation continued in the JCS Total Force Capability Assessment (TFCA); numerous PPBES studies (MRFS, OMNIBUS, TAA, etc.), nuclear requirements studies; and review and coordination with FII on numerous National intelligence documents.

e. (U) Threat Integration Branch.

(1) (U) The relocation of the branch from old office space in the AIA Headquarters area to new SCIF area occupied by the Threat Intelligence Division completed the consolidation of the division and greatly improved the ability of the Threat Integration Staff Officers to coordinate and manage threat support efforts in each of their respective mission areas. The move was completed in February 1985 and relocated the Exploitation and Application and Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branches in the same area.

(2) (U) Significant effort was expended in supporting the series of OSD directed follow-on evaluations for the Division Air Defense Gun (DIVAD) during the period October-July 1985 which led to the OSD decision to cancel the program. Other threat support efforts involved continued expansion of TISO coverage to all Major and Designated Acquisition Programs for which the Army had ongoing research, development and acquisition programs in being. The Data Link Vulnerability Analysis (DVAL) Task Force, which is a joint organization, involved efforts by the Army to implement the DVAL methodology for determining the vulnerability of RF data links to active

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hostile jamming. The Mobile Subscriber Equipment, SHORAD Command and Control Systems, also required increased support. During the year, Threat Coordinating Groups (TCG) continued to function as a valuable medium for bringing the Combat Development Community together with the Intelligence Community to insure that adequate intelligence production and threat support requirements were identified. The following TCGs met during the year: Chemical/Biological Warfare mission area, Mobile Subscriber Equipment, All Source Analysis System, Remotely Piloted Vehicle, Light Helicopter, Joint Surveillance Threat Attack Radar System, Theater Missile Defense, Forward Area Air Defense Systems, and Army Helicopter Improvement Program. In addition to the above TCG's, numerous other mini-TCGs were conducted by the TISOs in direct support to ongoing Army Staff, TRADOC and AMC programs.

2. (U) Current Intelligence Division.

a. (U) Organizational Changes. There were no structural changes to the division during the fiscal year. The editor position was civilianized as a GM-13 Intelligence Research Specialist position.

b. (U) Key Personnel.

(1) (U) Colonel Dwight W. Beach remained as division chief for the fiscal year.

(2) (U) Other:

(a) (U) Inability to fill the division's GS-3/4 clerk typist position for more than six months necessitated the expenditure of considerable overtime funds so that a second full-time typist was available for daily Black Book and Intelligence Summary preparation.

(b) (U) Although all regional analyst positions were filled, all but Latin America were one deep. To accommodate illness, leave, and other normal personnel absences, a guest analyst program was initiated, borrowing a regional specialist from the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) as the situation warranted. Only in this fashion, which initially engendered some resistance from ITAC, was the division able to sustain regional coverage and reporting of a credible nature during periods of peak personnel shortage.

(c) (U) August 20-29 saw the division subjected to its first official manpower survey, which concluded that one

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administrative (enlisted) and one graphics (civilian) slot should be eliminated. This ill-conceived recommendation would not be rejected until the next fiscal year.

c. (U) Narrative of Activities.

(1) (U) A Black Book readership survey in January 1985 confirmed that refinements introduced into the current intelligence production cycle in FY 84 were having the desired effect. Continued fine tuning of the division's recurring intelligence products saw the White House and Department of State added (at their request) as daily Black Book recipients. Evidence of analyst growth abounded as the division's Foreign Area Officers found themselves repeatedly sought out for their opinions and evaluations of world events. Confident, articulate regional analysts emerged during this fiscal year, in spite of the excessive hours demanded because of the need to operate the division at a bare-minimum (and highly unsatisfactory) staffing level.

(2) (U) With the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985, international terrorism and its potential impact on the US Army became an area of primary focus for division analysts. A quantum increase in the amount and depth of coverage given terrorism-related material, primarily in the Black Book, was the result. As the fiscal year ended with a new ACSI on board, the increasing emphasis for coverage of this vital area would see, in the next fiscal year, a decision to reallocate already limited resources to permit full-time monitoring

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of world events by exclusively terrorism-oriented analysts.

(3)(U) The relocation of the Foreign Intelligence Division (DAMI-FII) adjacent to the Current Intelligence Division in the second quarter of FY 85 led to marked increase in inter-division cooperation and coordination; activities heretofore noticeably deficient. As the fiscal year progressed, greater interaction between the two divisions occurred, and institutional (and personal) barriers gave way to a close, mutually supportive atmosphere of trust and good will. As the fiscal year ended, a strengthened Foreign Intelligence Directorate was clearly evident; from the division's point of view, new avenues and opportunities were available for current intelligence analysts to pursue similar policy-related objectives and projects as those undertaken by the Foreign Intelligence Division. The current intelligence blinders were removed, on both sides, with the result that OACSI's overall credibility was enhanced.

3. (U) Foreign Intelligence Division. The primary missions of the Foreign Intelligence Division continued to dominate its activities: providing intelligence support to the Secretary of the Army and to the Army Staff, and representing the Army in joint, national and international fora. Among the more significant actions were:

a. (U) Support to the Secretary of the Army and the Army Staff during the TWA hostage crisis in June 85, including participation in the Crisis Response Cell.

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b. (U) Preparation and coordination of the OACSI input to the XVI Conference of American Armies, held in Chile in November 85.

c. ^U~~(S)~~ Army Staff element responsible for coordinating actions relating to the death of LTC Nicholson and to the United States Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam including briefings for key Army, DoD and Congressional personnel.

SECTION 5

DIRECTORATE OF FOREIGN LIAISON1. (U) Organizational Changes.

(U) The position of Deputy Director, LTC, was changed to an Executive Officer, MAJ, in June 1985.

2. (U) Key Personnel.

a. (U) COL J. Allen Kimball, Deputy Director, was reassigned in February 1985.

b. (U) LTC John V. Lewin, Chief, Attache Coordination Branch, left the Directorate in July 1985 and was replaced in August 1985 by LTC Donald A. Dubay.

c. (U) MAJ Ruth A. Phillips was assigned as Executive Officer in August 1985.

3. (U) Narrative of Activities. During FY 85 the three branches within the Directorate accomplished the following activities:

a. (U) Attache Coordination Branch.

(1) (U) Processed accreditations to Department of the Army for 75 military and assistant military attaches.

(2) (U) Processed 691 foreign requests for visit authorizations to DA CONUS activities on behalf of foreign representatives.

(3) (U) Prepared read-ahead books for 142 visits to the Army leadership and the ACSI by foreign representatives.

(4) (U) Processed requests for Uniformed Services

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Identification and Privilege Cards for approximately 750 eligible foreign military personnel and their dependents.

(5) (U) Under Chief of Staff, Army, direction, staffed and obtained approval to modify DoD Dir 7250.13. The change, approved by the Comptroller of the Army in coordination with DoD and the other services, authorizes Major Commanders and Army Staff Principals to invite their foreign counterparts to the U.S. at U.S. Government expense, on behalf, and with the approval, of the Chief of Staff, Army.

(6) (U) Effective 30 Sep 85, terminated use of .0017 Intelligence Contingency Funds used in support of the foreign liaison and ACSI representation requirements. As of 1 Oct 86, .0012 funds exclusively are to be used for such requirements.

b. (U) Tours Branch.

(U) Army VIP tours for counterparts and guests of the SA, CSA, VCSA, and other senior DA officials:

	<u>TOURS CONDUCTED</u>	<u>FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS</u>
FY 85	9	42

(2) (U) Defense VIP tours for counterparts and guests of SECDEF, OSD, and CJCS on a rotational basis among the services:

	<u>TOURS CONDUCTED</u>	<u>FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS</u>
FY 85	6	148

(3) (U) ACSI tours for counterparts of the ACSI:

	<u>TOURS CONDUCTED</u>	<u>FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS</u>
<u>ACSI Counterparts Tours</u>		
FY 85	1	2

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TOURS CONDUCTED

FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Attache Tours

FY 85

3

123

(4) (U) Security Assistance Tours: There were two types of Security Assistance Tours; Orientation Training Tours (OTTs) and Washington, DC Schools Tours. OTTs were under the auspices of the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) or the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS), to acquaint senior foreign officers with U.S. Army doctrine and training methods. Washington, DC Schools Tours were made under IMET and FMS for foreign students attending U.S. Army service schools (career course level and above) to acquaint participants with HQDA, State Department, and other government and civilian institutions in the Washington, DC area.

TOURS CONDUCTED

FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS

OTTs

10

40

FY 85

Others

FY 85

1

38

Washington, DC School Tours

FY 85

11

896

(5) (U) Special Tours: These FY 85 tours were ad hoc/unprogrammed, yet officially hosted, foreign visits or tours not falling under other programs.

TOURS CONDUCTED

FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS

FY 85

8

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c. (U) Protocol Branch.

(1) (U) Arranged the following social functions: 51 lunches, 9 dinners, 7 social hours for military attaches and their assistants, a military review, 4th of July reception for military attaches and their ladies, and a Fall Reception hosted by the ACSI to introduce the military attaches and their ladies to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army.

(2) Organized for the first time a musical concert by the Army Blues for the military attaches and their ladies.

(3) Processed 19 awards for foreign military dignitaries.

(4) Prepared 72 and 53 holiday congratulatory letters for signature of CSA and ACSI, respectively, for their foreign counterparts.

(5) Prepared an additional 17 and 11 miscellaneous letters to CSA and ACSI counterparts.

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SECTION 6

INTELLIGENCE AUTOMATION MANAGEMENT OFFICE (U)

1. (U) An Overview of FY 85.

a. (U) The Intelligence Automation Management Office (DAMI-AM) continued its mission of being the ARSTAF monitor and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) funds executor for automation and telecommunications systems for Army Intelligence Data Handling Systems (IDHS) sites and Army-funded U.S. Command IDHS sites. In addition, at the direction of the DAS and the ACSI, DAMI-AM picked up the responsibility for planning automation support for the OACSI staff and coordinating all actions for information management support for OACSI. The major activities centered on planning and budgeting for computer assisted support for the intelligence staffs and organizations of the Army MACOMs, U.S. Commands, and the organizations within the Army Intelligence Agency. During the past several years the amount of funding for automation and telecommunications projects has grown over 500% from approximately \$11 million in 1981 to \$61 million in FY 86.

b. (U) During FY 85, the degree and amount of coordination accomplished between DAMI-AM, the offices of RSE and RSM within DIA, and AFIS-IND (USAF), became even closer than before. So many technical and systems problems were common to all organizations that each tried to share resources and effort to achieve joint solutions.

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2. (U) Organizational Changes.

a. (U) There were no major organizational changes to DAMI-AM in terms of structure during FY 85. The office remained structured with two branches: the Life Cycle Management Branch (DAMI-AML) and the Plans and Budget Branch (DAMI-AMP). Two positions, the communications specialist and the hardware specialist were moved out of DAMI-AMP and placed directly under the Chief of DAMI-AM.

b. (U) Personnel Situation.

(1) (U) During FY 85, the office was reduced in authorized size from 17 to 16. That position was lost as a part of the action to reduce the ARSTAF by three percent. The personnel turnover in FY 85 was unusually high.

(2) (U) During FY 85 the following personnel departed DAMI-AM:

a (U) Mr. Robert Walsh, the Chief of Plans and Budget Branch (DAMI-AMP) accepted a promotion to GS-15 in the United States Information Agency. Mr. Cooperman was temporarily appointed as Chief of DAMI-AMP and later permanently appointed to that position. However, the position had been downgraded from a GM-14 to GM-13 so this resulted in only a lateral transfer for Mr. Cooperman.

b (U) The position of Chief of the Life Cycle Management Branch (DAMI-AML) was also downgraded from a GM-14 to a GM-13. Ms. Dot Darrach was also permanently appointed as the chief of

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that branch, but because of the downgrading action this was only a lateral transfer for her instead of a promotion.

c (U) Mr. Landis Thornton, computer specialist, took a lateral transfer to HQ MILPERCEN.

d (U) Verona Avans, secretary, departed having received a promotion with ODCSOPS. Linda Bryant and Robin Sims, secretaries, both joined and departed DAMI-AM during the year. Each received and accepted promotions to other offices.

(3) (U) During FY 85 the following personnel joined DAMI-AM:

a (U) Mrs. Barbara Howard joined as a budget analyst.

b (U) Teeiree Brown and Toni Wynn joined as secretaries.

c (U) Mr. Michael Clarke joined DAMI-AM as a computer specialist in the Life Cycle Management Branch.

d (U) MAJ Owens was assigned to the Plans and Programs Branch.

e (U) LTC Manning was assigned to the GDIP budget actions in Plans and Programs Branch.

3. (U) Narrative of Activities.

a. (U) The first annual Information Management Plan (IMP) was submitted by DAMI-AM on 1 July 1985 to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Management (OACSIM) for automation support to OACSI and HQ, U.S. Army Intelligence Agency (AIA). This automation support initiative primarily consisted of buying microcomputers and printers to support the OACSI and HQ AIA

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organizations. However, in the out-years, it also included netting some of these computers to the HODA Local Area Network (LAN) and projected funds for an OACSI automated storage and retrieval system.

b. (U) Several systems for IDHS sites moved out of the concept development stage into full development and fielding. Those systems were:

(1) (U) The Relocatable Army Processors for Intelligence Dissemination - Europe (RAPIDE) for ODCSI, USAREUR. The request for proposal (RFP) was advertised for the hardware integration on this project. Tobyhanna Depot began developing the prototype vans in which the RAPIDE hardware would be mounted and operate.

(2) (U) The Army Threat Intelligence Production System (ATIPS) for HQAIA.

(3) (U) The Korean Intelligence Support System (KISS) for HQ USFK and the Combined Forces Command.

(4) (U) The WESTCOM Intelligence Support System (WISS) was connected as a PACTIDS Remote Site, which gave them connectivity to the intelligence files at the Intelligence Production and Analysis Center (IPAC) at HQ PACOM, but still did not give them the additional automated message handling capability which they desired.

c. (U) The computers were procured for these systems and software development was well underway for each of them by the end of the fiscal year.

d. (U) Several other systems moved from the funding approval state into concept development. Those systems were:

(1) (U) The USSOUTHCOM Intelligence Support System (SCISS).

(2) (U) The Fort Bragg IDHS facility, which is undergoing a major upgrade to serve HQ ARCENT, units located at Fort Bragg, plus all CONUS-based divisions in the United States.

(3) (U) An automated message handling capability for HQ SHAPE. HQ SHAPE submitted their hardware acquisition plan on 18 Jun 85, and DAMI-AM subsequently started the procurement action to obtain that hardware.

(4) (U) The Deployable Intelligence Data Handling System (DIDHS) for HQ ARCENT for use when they have to deploy on exercises or wartime contingencies outside their garrison location.

(5) (U) The USEUCOM Intelligence Support System (EISS), which is a replacement for their existing AIDES system plus a second site operation which would make their automation support more survivable in wartime. The Mission Element Need Statement for EISS was validated by DIA on 19 Nov 84 and approved by the Under Secretary of the Army on 21 Mar 85.

(6) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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A concept was developed for using stand-alone microcomputers with a data management file system which would allow them to store, search, and retrieve their records in an automated form.

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SECTION 7

PLANS, PROGRAM AND BUDGET OFFICE

1. Major Organization Changes. There were no major organizational changes affecting the Plans, Program and Budget Office during FY 85.

2. Key Personnel Changes.

a. Program and Budget Formulation Branch. The branch chief, LTC Armstrong, retired from the Army in October 1984. He was succeeded in that position by MAJ E. Ray Yount.

b. Budget Execution, Audit and Management Branch.

(1) Mr. Earl Myers, Management Analyst, left the branch to take a job with the Navy in Annapolis, MD. He was replaced in July, 1985 by Mr. David Mann, who came to OACSI from the Force Development Directorate, DCSOPS.

(2) Mrs. Bertha Harris, Budget Analyst, left OACSI for a promotion in the newly formed OACSI FOA, the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency. Mr. Harris was replaced by Ms. Charlotte Wink, who came on board during July, 1985.

(3) The Audit Team was brought up to strength with the hiring of Ms. Judy Harrington, Auditor, who came on board on July, 1985.

3. Narrative of Activities.

a. Program and Budget Formulation Branch.

(1) The Program and Budget Formulation Branch managed the resourcing of Army intelligence requirements through the dual Comptroller of the Army and Director of Central Intelligence

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programming and budgeting systems. The branch coordinated all program and budget formulation matters for the Army's portion of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), regulated pursuant to Executive Order 12333, and the Security and Investigative Activities (S&IA) Program. Oversight functions of the branch encompassed program development and budget formulation of general military intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and cryptologic programs totaling in excess of \$600 million and 12,000 military and civilian manpower positions.

(2) Program and Budget Formulation Branch personnel engaged in frequent liaison with Army, OSD, and other joint agency elements. The branch provided OACSI representation on the 0-6 level Program and Budget Committee.

b. Budget Execution, Audit and Management Branch.

(1) Branch auditors conducted audits of CONUS and OCONUS intelligence activities. The auditors reviewed the usage of intelligence funds and wrote audit reports for all activities reviewed.

(2) The branch coordinated with USAMARDA on the manpower survey of the U.S. Army Intelligence Operations Detachment (USAIOD), on OACSI FOA. Branch management analysts coordinated the preparation of survey forms by the USAIOD elements, and scheduled entrance interviews and on-site visits by survey team members. The survey resulted in a recommendation for fewer manpower requirements than requested by the ACSI. Reclamas to the survey report were prepared, and numerous meetings with the

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survey team members were held in an effort to resolve differences. No agreement on the survey had been reached by the end of the fiscal year.

(3) The budget analyst conducted budget execution and financial operations and policy.

c. Plans Branch.

(1) The Plans Branch prepared and reviewed Army intelligence plans and coordinated the Army portions of all Joint, Service and National Intelligence Plans.

(2) Branch personnel coordinated input for, and wrote the FY 85 Army Intelligence Management Plans (AIMP). The AIMP is the capstone document for the future of Army Intelligence. It identified shortcomings in intelligence mission accomplishments, and it developed requirements, objectives, and tasks to solve those shortcomings. The AIMP facilitated the translation of identified requirements into the program and budget process. The Plans Branch tasked other OACSI elements and MACOMs to provide input to the AIMP, which was organized along functional lines. The input was reviewed and provided the basis for the finished plan.

UNCLASSIFIED**APPENDIX A****CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY, COUNTERPART (U)****FY 85**

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u>ESCORTS</u>
France	17 - 27 Oct 84	7	1
Norway	25 Nov - 6 Dec 84	4	1
Jordan	9 - 18 Jan 85	4	1
Peru	6 - 15 Feb 85	4	1
Turkey	17 - 27 Apr 85	5	1
Japan	8 - 16 May 85	5	2
Dominican Republic	18 - 28 Jun 85	3	1
Pakistan	7 - 19 Jul 85	6	1
Australia	4 - 13 Sep 85	4	1

TOTAL TOURS - 9**TOTAL PARTICIPANTS - 42****A-1****UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED**SPECIALS/DEFENSE VIP TOURS* (U)****FY 85**

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u>ESCORTS</u>
DSACEUR NATO	30 Sep - 5 Oct 84	2	1
*Greece - CJCS	3 - 10 Nov 84	6	1
Mark Clark Lecture	14 - 19 Oct 84	3	1
Mexico - Industry Visit	18 - 22 Nov 84	2	1
*Italy - Minister of Defense	22 - 27 Jan 85	12	1
*Spain - Minister of Defense	10 - 16 Mar 85	4	1
*Turkey - Prime Minister	2 - 4 Apr 85	1	-
NATO High Level Group	14 - 18 Apr 85	98	1
*Japan - OJCS (J-5)	19 - 25 May 85	2	3
National Defense College of Mexico	20 - 31 May 85	1	6
Belgium Royal High College	21 - 25 May 85	35	1
Morocco Joint Military Commission	27 - 31 Jul 85	19	2
Royal College Defense Studies	6 - 15 Sep 85		
United Kingdom	28 Sep - 4 Oct 85	14	2
*Saudi Arabia - Minister of Defense	28 Sep - 5 Oct 85	23	3
 TOTAL TOURS - 14	 TOTAL PARTICIPANTS - 252		

A-2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE COUNTERPART (U)

FY 85

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u>ESCORTS</u>
Thailand	14 - 20 Jul 85	2	1

TOTAL HOURS - 1

TOTAL PARTICIPANTS - 2

A-3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FOREIGN ATTACHE TOURS (U)

FY 85

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u>ESCORTS</u>
FALL ATTACHE TOUR	21 - 25 Oct 85	28	6
Atlanta, FORSCOM, Ft Benning, Lockheed Aircraft Company, Ft McClellan.			
SKI ATTACHE TOUR	27 - 30 Jan 85	48	10
SPRING ATTACHE TOUR	28 - 7 May 85	47	7
Detroit, MI (TACOM); General Motors; Ft Leavenworth, KS; 5th Inf Div, Ft Polk; New Orleans; LA National Guard; Allied Chemical Company; Ft Bragg, NC.			

TOTAL TOURS - 3 TOTAL PARTICIPANTS - 123

UNCLASSIFIED**ORIENTATION TRAINING TOURS (U)****FY 85**

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u># GUESTS</u>	<u># ESCORTS</u>
Germany	3 - 19 Oct 84	5	1
Algeria	5 - 19 Nov 84	4	1
Mexico	3 - 6 Dec 84	5	1
Ben'in	16 - 30 Jan 85	3	1
Seychelles	23 Jan - 6 Feb 85	1	1
Portugal	10 - 24 Apr 85	3	1
Jordon	12 - 26 Jun 85	6	1
Yemen	10 - 24 Jul 85	6	1
Swaziland	17 - 31 Jul 85	3	1
Egypt	10 - 24 Sep 85	4	1

TOTAL TOURS - 10**TOTAL PARTICIPANTS - 40**

OTHER TOURS

SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS	5 - 26 Aug 85	38	3
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TOTAL TOURS - 1**TOTAL PARTICIPANTS - 38****A-5****UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

SCHOOL TOURS (U)

FY 85

<u>SCHOOL TOUR</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>	<u>COUNTRIES</u>
I-85	23 - 28 Oct 84	73	32
II-85	27 Nov - 2 Dec 84	61	23
III-85	22 - 27 Jan 85	78	36
IV-85	19 - 24 Feb 85	52	20
V-85	19 - 24 Mar 85	88	29
VI-85	23 - 28 Apr 85	130	35
VII-85	5 - 12 May 85	98	60
VIII-85	18 - 23 Jun 85	89	40
IX-85	23 - 28 Jul 85	82	33
X-85	20 -25 Aug 85	113	41
XI-85	24 - 29 Sep 85	32	16

TOTAL TOURS - 11

TOTAL STUDENTS - 896

A-6

UNCLASSIFIED